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Abstract
Speakers of English frequently associate location in space with valence, as in moving up and
down the “social ladder.” If such an association also holds for the sagittal axis, an object “in front
of” another object would be evaluated more positively than the one “behind.” Yet how people
conceptualize relative locations depends on which frame of reference (FoR) they adopt—and
hence on cross-linguistically diverging preferences. What is conceptualized as “in front” in one
variant of the relative FoR (e.g., translation) is “behind” under another variant (reflection), and
vice versa. Do such diverging conceptualizations of an object’s location also lead to diverging
evaluations? In two studies employing an implicit association test, we demonstrate, first, that
speakers of German, Chinese, and Japanese indeed evaluate the object “in front of” another object
more positively than the one “behind.” Second, and crucially, the reversal of which object is con-
ceptualized as “in front” involves a corresponding reversal of valence, suggesting an impact of lin-
guistically imparted FoR preferences on evaluative processes.
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1. Introduction
Spatial representations are of fundamental importance for human cognition. They are
crucial for orientation and navigation (e.g., Golledge, 1999; Hutchins, 1983), are consid-
ered part of children’s “core knowledge” (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), and affect how we
conceptualize abstract domains such as time (Bender & Beller, 2014; Nu~nez & Cooper-
rider, 2013) or number (Dehaene, 2003; Walsh, 2003). Beyond these purely cognitive
aspects, spatial representations also appear to provide metaphorical structure for evalua-
tive judgments, especially along the vertical axis and the lateral axis, with up and right
being predominantly linked to positive valence, and down or left to negative valence in
various cultures (Crawford, Margolies, Drake, & Murphy, 2006; Keating, 1995; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999; Meier & Robinson, 2004). Empirically attested associations include the
vertical axis (reflected in the “social ladder”) and the lateral axis (“getting it right” versus
“having two left feet”), but expressions such as “making headway” and “standing in the
forefront” versus “lagging behind” and “being backward” hint at corresponding associa-
tions along the sagittal axis as well.
The relationship between space and valence, however, is more complex than these
examples suggest, and may be mediated by additional factors. For instance, the more pos-
itive evaluation of objects to the right than of those to the left is reversed in left-handers
(Casasanto, 2009, 2011). Lateralization in terms of handedness even overrides strong cul-
tural conventions (de la Fuente, Casasanto, Roman, & Santiago, 2015), and it may serve
as point of departure when taking another person’s perspective (Kominsky & Casasanto,
2013). Yet handedness only affects people’s embodied experiences of their own right and
left; it does not determine whether they mentally represent an object as being located to
the right or left. In this instance, evaluations of objects are therefore directly dependent
on location in space: If an object changes location, its evaluation changes. Now consider
an instance, in which it is not location in space that changes, but rather the mental repre-
sentation of this location. Is the valence of objects also affected if relative positions them-
selves are conceptualized differently depending on a person’s preference for referring to
these positions? We addressed this question with a focus on the sagittal axis, which is the
only axis along which conceptualization of location is affected in distinct ways by lin-
guistic and cultural conventions (Beller, Singmann, H€uther, & Bender, 2015; Bennardo,
2000; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004).
Indeed, what is assigned as FRONT or BACK along the sagittal axis depends on the frame
of reference (FoR) one adopts. Spatial FoRs are cognitive tools used to construct an ori-
ented space within which spatial relations among objects are identified, that is, they help
to locate one object (the figure F) in reference to another object (the ground object G), as
in “The ball is behind the box.” All types of FoR have in common that they are coordi-
nate systems consisting of intersecting axes (e.g., a vertical, sagittal, and lateral axis), but
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they differ with regard to where they are anchored and how they are oriented. Such FoRs
have been extensively studied, and distinct theoretical traditions have created a plethora
of labels for the different types of FoRs. The approach adopted here follows the terminol-
ogy and categorizations described in Levinson (2003), which for cross-linguistic studies
is the one most widely applied (e.g., Bennardo, 2002; Levinson, 2003; Majid et al., 2004;
Pederson et al., 1998; Senft, 1997; alternative terminologies and categorizations are dis-
cussed in Levinson, 2003, p. 26; see also Bohnemeyer & O’Meara, 2012; Danziger,
2010; Grabowski, 1999; O’Meara & Perez Baez, 2011; Talmy, 2000).
The relative FoR relevant for our study is anchored in an observer different from the
ground object. Therefore, to locate the figure in reference to the ground, the observer’s
coordinate system originally anchored in the observer needs to be transferred to the
ground (Fig. 1). Crucially, this can be done in different ways—inter alia by shifting it to
the ground (translation) or by mirroring it in the ground (reflection)—leading to opposing
assignments of FRONT and BACK for the very same arrangement: Whereas translation
implies a further-away object to be conceptualized as “in front of” the ground and a
(A) Translation














Fig. 1. Two variants of the relative FoR (Levinson, 2003); F/G, figure/ground; L/R, left/right; V, viewpoint
of the observer.
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nearer object as “behind,” reflection implies the nearer object as “in front” and the fur-
ther-away object as “behind.”
Crucially, both translation and reflection are equally valid perspectives on spatial con-
stellations,1 and it is basically a matter of convention, which variant (if any) is to be pre-
ferred for mutual understanding. A survey across seven languages revealed widely
diverging preferences for adopting relative FoR variants (Beller & Bender, 2017; Beller
et al., 2015). Reflection was adopted by most participants speaking German (reflection:
88.4%; translation: 5.8%) and by a majority of those speaking Norwegian (71.9% vs.
21.9%), US-English (71.2% vs. 22.7%), and Farsi (40.9 vs. 28.8%); translation was
adopted by a majority of the participants speaking Chinese (reflection: 16.7%; translation:
38.9%), Japanese (36.7% vs. 48.6%), and Tongan (7.7% vs. 57.7%).2 As can be seen
from these data, there is some within-group variability, and apart from language, a few
additional factors have been identified that appear to affect which variant gets chosen.
For instance, while the likelihood of translation increases when motion is involved (Gra-
bowski & Miller, 2000; Hill, 1978, 1982), the likelihood of reflection increases when the
figure is occluded by the ground object (Bennardo, 2000; Hill, 1978), presumably based
on more general anthropomorphological principles guiding people’s referencing strategies
(Grabowski, 1999).
According to these principles, the positive pole along the sagittal axis would be in the
direction of sight; that is, locations conceived of as being “in front of” people would be
evaluated as more positive than those “behind” them. As we have seen, with a relative
FoR, FRONT/BACK relations are transferred into the ground object (Fig. 1), and this implies
the possibility that (the location of) a figure F conceived of as being “in front of” the
ground G would also be evaluated more positively than those “behind” the ground. In
contrast to the former case (i.e., objects being “in front of” or “behind” the observer),
which involves an actual difference in location, the latter case (the figure being “in front
of” or “behind” the ground depending on the FoR variant) only involves a difference in
how this location is conceptualized.
Whether these diverging assignments of FRONT and BACK lead to diverging evaluations
is the question we sought to answer. As suggested by the metaphor approach, we
assumed that regardless of FoR preference, speakers of widely different languages evalu-
ate objects more positively when conceptualizing them as “in front of” another object
than those conceptualized as “behind.” Crucially, since the object conceptualized as “in
front” depends on FoR preference, speakers with a preference for translation should eval-
uate the further-away object more positively, whereas speakers with a preference for re-
flection should evaluate the nearer object more positively.
2. Study 1
To investigate the effect of FoR preferences on evaluation, we needed samples of par-
ticipants that differed in their preference for either reflection or translation. In view of the
cross-linguistic distribution of the relative FoRs as obtained from surveys using language
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elicitation tasks (Beller & Bender, 2017; Beller et al., 2015), we therefore recruited native
speakers of German in which reflection is prevalent, and of Chinese and Japanese in
which translation is more frequent. Using an implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), we introduced a novel approach into this field of research
to indirectly assess the positive versus negative valence of objects that the participants




The samples consisted of 43 native speakers of German (28 females; Mage 23 years,
range: 18–35), 40 native speakers of Chinese (27 females; Mage 27 years, range: 22–38),
and 40 native speakers of Japanese (22 females; Mage 19 years, range: 18–34). Most par-
ticipants were university students of various disciplines, ranging from bachelor to PhD
level, and were recruited in their native languages via internet postings, flyers, and per-
sonal approach at university courses, international clubs, or other academic activities.
Data collection took place in Germany (for German- and Chinese-speaking participants)
and Japan (for Japanese-speaking participants), and it was conducted in the participants’
mother tongue by native speakers of German, Chinese, or Japanese, respectively, as
experimenters. Although Chinese participants were recruited in Germany, all participants
were born in China, with both of their parents being native speakers of Chinese. On aver-
age, Chinese participants had been living in Germany for 2.82 years (SD = 1.88) and
reported fluent proficiency in Chinese (M = 4.98, SD = 0.16) compared to rather moder-
ate proficiency in German (M = 3.07, SD = 1.29) and English (M = 3.45, SD = 0.90) on
5-point rating scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (fluent). For all samples, participa-
tion was voluntary, and it was rewarded with course credit or with 2 Euros or 400 Yen,
respectively.
2.1.2. Overall procedure
Upon arrival, participants were welcomed by a native speaker as experimenter and pro-
vided informed consent in their respective mother tongue. In individual sessions lasting
for about 10 min, participants first completed the IAT before providing demographic data
on age, gender, handedness, their major subject or profession, and, for Chinese partici-
pants, information on language skills as well as for how long they had been living in
Germany.
2.1.3. The implicit association test
To be able to assess participants’ spontaneous preferences and to prevent a potential
biasing, we chose the IAT as an implicit mean of assessment. The IAT presented partici-
pants with positive and negative nouns in a valence discrimination task and with pictures
displaying a figure and a ground object in a spatial discrimination task. Nouns were to be
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categorized as being positive or negative, whereas pictures were to be categorized accord-
ing to whether the figure object was in front of or behind the ground object. By leaving
the latter decision to the participant, we were able to identify each participant’s FoR (as
explained below).
The crucial IAT blocks combined the spatial and the valence discrimination tasks by
mapping the four categories (positive/negative and in front of/behind) to two response
keys in one of two ways: by mapping in front of and positive on one key and behind and
negative on the other, or by mapping behind and positive on one key and in front of and
negative on the other. Research on the IAT consistently shows that participants respond
faster and more accurately when the two categories that share a response key are overlap-
ping than when they are not (Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman, 2010). Accordingly,
if in front is evaluated more positively than behind, then responses should be faster and
more accurate in the in front of–positive/behind–negative mapping than in the in front of–
negative/behind–positive mapping. If, by contrast, in front is perceived more negatively
than behind, the response pattern should be reversed; and if no such link exists between
space and valence, response speed and accuracy should not differ between mappings.
The performance difference between the crucial IAT blocks is reflected in the so-called
IAT effect, which is interpreted as revealing direction and size of the association strength
between, in the present case, the space and valence categories. In the current study, IAT
effects were coded such that positive values corresponded to the expected evaluation of
in front as more positive than behind, independently of whether participants adopted
translation or reflection to conceptualize where the target object is located. Assuming that
all our participants evaluate objects more positively when conceptualizing them as “in
front of” (than “behind”) another object, we expected positive IAT effects in all three
languages. These effects may differ in size between the samples of different languages,
as there is no reason to assume that the space/valence associations should be of the exact
same strength across cultures. IAT effects should not differ in size, however, between
participants adopting translation and participants adopting reflection (independent of the
language) because positive IAT effects reflect the very preference for in front of as com-
pared to behind that we expected for all participants. Note that such a finding would
imply that, with different FoR preferences, different objects are evaluated more posi-
tively: the further-away object by participants adopting translation, and the nearer object
by participants adopting reflection.
2.1.3.1. Materials: For the valence discrimination task, six positive nouns (health, happi-
ness, smile, joy, peace, and friend) and six negative nouns (agony, suffering, stench, mis-
hap, illness, and war) had to be categorized as positive or negative by pressing one of
two response keys. For the spatial discrimination task, 12 schematic drawings of two neu-
tral objects were used. The objects were arranged on the front/back axis and were distin-
guishable by shape (cylinder, reversed pyramid, cube, and ball) and color (blue/green).
Counterbalanced across participants, the objects of one color were singled out as target
objects that had to be categorized via pressing a key as “in front of” or “behind” the
objects of the respective other color. If, for instance, the target color was green,
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participants preferring translation (vs. reflection) would categorize the green cylinder in
Fig. 2a as “behind” (vs. “in front of”) the blue cube.
2.1.3.2. IAT procedure: The IATs were implemented as standard seven-block IATs (for
details, see Table 1 and Fig. 3): Participants first completed two single-task practice
blocks (one on spatial and one on valence discrimination). In Blocks 3 and 4, the two
tasks were combined by mapping the four categories to two response keys (e.g., in front
of/positive on one key and behind/negative on the other). Block 5 was again a single-task
block on spatial discrimination, but with the response key assignment reversed. In Blocks
6 and 7, the task of Block 5 was combined with the valence discrimination task of Block
2, thus mapping behind/positive on one key and in front of/negative on the other.
The order of combined tasks was counterbalanced across participants (see Nosek,
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). Stimuli were presented in the center of a vertical computer
screen against a white background with an inter-trial interval of 500 ms. In each block,
response labels were presented for the two tasks at the top left and top right corner of the
screen. Responses were given by pressing the D- or L-key on the keyboard with the left
or right index finger. Ideally, the response keys at least for the spatial discrimination task
would be along the same axis as the relative locations under scrutiny (Bender & Beller,
Fig. 2. Examples of spatial stimuli used in (a) Study 1 (left) and (b) Study 2 (right).
Table 1
Task sequence and example of response key assignment
Block No. of Trials Task
Example of Response Key Assignment
D-key L-key
1 26 Spatial discrimination behind in front of
2 26 Valence discrimination negative positive
3 28 Initial combined task behind/negative in front of/positive
4 52 Initial combined task behind/negative in front of/positive
5 26 Reversed spatial discrimination in front of behind
6 28 Reversed combined task in front of/negative behind/positive
7 52 Reversed combined task in front of/negative behind/positive
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Fig. 3. Examples of trial sequences for the two discrimination tasks in single-task blocks and for the initial
and the reversed combined tasks.
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2014; Fuhrman et al., 2011). However, predefining a further away and a nearer key along
the sagittal axis as “in front of” and “behind,” respectively, would compromise the very
data we aim to collect, namely on how exactly participants assign FRONT and BACK along
this axis. For this reason, we chose keys along the lateral axis, for which participants can
be expected to be most familiar. Mapping of FRONT and BACK to the left and right key,
respectively, switched between Blocks 1, 3, and 4 versus Blocks 5, 6, and 7.
All blocks used one trial per response category that appeared within each block as
warm-up trials. Single-task blocks were thus preceded by two additional warm-up trials,
and combined-task blocks were preceded by four additional warm-up trials. Warm-up tri-
als used additional stimuli and were excluded from the analyses. Stimuli were presented
randomly with the restriction that in the combined-task blocks (i.e., Blocks 3, 4, 6, and
7), spatial and valence stimuli were presented in strictly alternating order. Instructions
were provided in the participant’s native language (i.e., German, Chinese, or Japanese).
2.1.4. Assessment of FoR preference
The data obtained from the spatial discrimination block (i.e., Block 1) in the IAT were
used to determine a participant’s preference for one of the variants of the relative FoR.
Specifically, if the participant responded “in front of” in more than 50% of the trials in
which the target object was the nearer one, a preference for reflection was inferred. Con-
versely, if the participant responded “in front of” in more than 50% of the trials with the
target object being the one further away, a preference for translation was inferred. The
inferred preferences were then transferred to the analyses of the crucial combined task
blocks (see below). Note that such an assessment was necessary because adoption of a
specific FoR is not determined by language, but based on a combination of (sub-)cultural
conventions and individual preferences (Beller et al., 2015; Grabowski & Miller, 2000;
Hill, 1982), and it must therefore be gleaned from each participant’s actual spatial dis-
crimination decision. Although individual preferences can change over time and depend-
ing on task and context, previous studies (Beller et al., 2015; Rothe-Wulf, Beller, &
Bender, 2015) suggest that set effects are strong enough to keep FoR preferences stable
throughout the continuous course of this experiment (an assumption bearing out, as
reported below). As one consequence, participants did not receive error feedback during
IAT trials for incorrect responses as is otherwise often done in IATs.
2.2. Results
Using Tukey’s (1977) criterion, we first examined whether any participant was an
extreme outlier in terms of mean response latency or error rates3 in the combined tasks
(i.e., with values three times the interquartile range below the first or above the third
quartile). This led to the exclusion of two German participants with error rates above
24% (M = 6.57%, SD = 7.52), three Chinese participants with error rates above 34%
(M = 7.76%, SD = 11.20), and five Japanese participants, four with error rates above
50% (M = 10.49%, SD = 15.02) and one with particularly slow response latencies of
1,281 ms (M = 726 ms, SD = 145). Among the remaining participants, reflection was
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preferred by all 41 German participants (100%), by 28 Chinese participants (76%), and
by 34 Japanese participants (97%), whereas translation was preferred by nine Chinese
participants (24%) and one Japanese participant (3%). Consistency in FoR adoption
across the stimuli of the spatial discrimination task was high for all three samples and
across FoR preferences, with M > 94% in each subgroup.
As recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), IAT effects were calculated
using the D6 scoring algorithm (used for inferential statistics only; for ease of interpretation,
descriptive statistics are based on raw latencies). To test whether speakers of each of the
three languages evaluate objects in front more positively compared to behind, IAT effects
were tested against zero in separate t tests for each language. As expected (and detailed in
Table 2), IAT effects were significant in all three samples of Study 1, M ≥ 146 ms,
t ≥ 3.07, p ≤ .004, indicating considerably faster and more accurate responses to the in front
of/positive—behind/negative mapping than to the reversed mapping.
Importantly, participants’ better performance in the in front of/positive—behind/nega-
tive mapping as compared to the behind/positive—in front of/negative mapping was inde-
pendent of their preferred variant of the relative FoR. Recall that nine of the 37 Chinese
participants adopted translation. IAT effects for these participants were of the same size
as those for participants preferring reflection, t(35) = 1.06, p = .298.
2.3. Discussion
Across the three languages, participants evaluated in front more positively than behind
—irrespective of their native language or cultural background. For the quarter of the Chi-
nese participants preferring translation over reflection, the reversal of which object is con-
ceptualized as “in front of” the other involved a corresponding reversal of evaluation of
one and the same object: Further-away objects were more positive than nearer objects for
participants preferring translation, but more negative for participants preferring reflection.
While the results of Study 1 are basically straightforward, the proportion of transla-
tional references among the Chinese- and Japanese-speaking participants was lower than
anticipated. One reason could be that the nearer object partly occluded the further-away
object, which may have highlighted the former at the cost of the latter (hence privileging
reflection; cf. Bennardo, 2000; Grabowski, 1999). In addition, partially occluded objects
may be devalued a priori. Since it was always the further-away object that was partially
occluded, devaluation may have contributed to the more negative evaluation of this object
Table 2
Implicit association test effects in the different samples of Study 1 and Study 2
Study Sample (N) M (SD) 95% CI t p Cohen’s dD6
Study 1 German (41) 231 (230) [158, 303] 7.73 <.001 1.21
Chinese (37) 146 (284) [51, 241] 3.07 .004 0.50
Japanese (35) 167 (207) [105, 236] 5.48 <.001 0.93
Study 2 German (43) 292 (228) [222, 362] 11.59 <.001 1.77
Chinese (48) 153 (309) [64, 243] 2.54 .015 0.37
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by the majority of participants who preferred reflection and hence categorized the
partially occluded further-away object as behind.
3. Study 2
To exclude partial occlusion as an alternative account, we repeated Study 1 with the




The new samples consisted of 50 native speakers each of German (35 females; Mage
22 years, range: 18–34) and Chinese (37 females; Mage 25 years, range: 18–33). All par-
ticipants were university students of various disciplines, ranging from bachelor to PhD
level; recruitment was identical as in Study 1. Data collection took place in Germany and
was conducted in the participants’ mother tongue by native speakers of German or Chi-
nese, respectively, as experimenters. As in Study 1, all Chinese participants were born in
China, with both of their parents being native speakers of Chinese. On average, they had
been living in Germany for 1.63 years (SD = 1.42) and reported fluent proficiency in Chi-
nese (M = 4.96, SD = 0.20) compared to rather moderate proficiency in German
(M = 2.53, SD = 0.97) and good command of English (M = 3.76, SD = 0.86).
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
For the spatial discrimination task, we now used photographs of real objects that were
similar to the objects used in Study 1 both in shape and color, but differed in that no
object was occluded (see Fig. 2b). In addition, an observer with the same looking direc-
tion as that of the participant was inserted to emphasize perspective-taking (cf. Beller,
Bohlen, H€uther, & Bender, 2016; Beller et al., 2015). Apart from this, material and (over-
all) procedure were the same as in Study 1.
3.2. Results
The same criteria as in Study 1 led to the exclusion of seven German participants with
error rates above 21% (M = 9.67%, SD = 13.30) and two Chinese participants with error
rates above 33% (M = 7.58%, SD = 10.25). Among the remaining participants, reflection
was preferred by all 43 German participants (100%) and by 33 Chinese participants
(69%), whereas translation was preferred by 15 Chinese participants (31%). Consistency
in FoR adoption across stimuli was again high, with M > 91% in each subgroup.
IAT effects were computed as in Study 1 and were again significant in the two samples,
M ≥ 153 ms, t ≥ 2.54, p ≤ .015, indicating faster and more accurate responses to the in front
of/positive—behind/negative mapping than to the reversed mapping (for details, see Table 2).
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Again, participants’ better performance in the in front of/positive—behind/negative mapping
as compared to the behind/positive—in front of/negative mapping was independent of their
preferred FoR, as indicated by the non-significant difference between IAT effects for Chinese
participants adopting translation versus reflection, t(46) = 0.29, p = .773.
3.3. Discussion
As in Study 1, participants evaluated in front more positively than behind—irrespective
of their native language or cultural background. And again, the reversal of which object
is conceptualized as “in front of” the other involved a corresponding reversal of evalua-
tion. Due to the modified stimuli used in this study, partial occlusion of the further-away
object can be excluded as an explanation of its devaluation.
4. General discussion
Does the way in which we evaluate objects depend also on how we conceptualize their
location in space, rather than simply on where they are located? The work reported here sug-
gests that this is indeed the case. Findings from two studies across three languages and cul-
tural settings (with native speakers of German in Germany, of Chinese in Germany, and of
Japanese in Japan) indicate that participants evaluate objects more positively when they
conceptualize them as “in front of” another object than when they conceptualize them as
“behind.” Importantly, this positive evaluation holds for the farther-away object when trans-
lation is adopted, yet for the nearer object when reflection is adopted.
The evidence is in line with the metaphor approach, according to which spatial con-
cepts provide structure not only for more abstract domains but also for evaluative judg-
ments. While associations between space and valence have been demonstrated for the
vertical axis (Keating, 1995; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schu-
bert, 2005) and the lateral axis (Casasanto, 2009, 2011; de la Fuente et al., 2015), the pre-
sent studies demonstrate these associations also for the sagittal axis. More concretely,
they reveal that phrases such as “making headway” and “standing in the forefront” versus
“lagging behind” and “being backward” are not mere metaphorical expressions, but
reflect a genuinely more positive evaluation of entities located “in front of” other entities.
These associations are likely grounded in real-world experiences (e.g., being in front con-
fers clear advantages when queuing for limited goods, for obtaining an undisturbed view,
or in sports). The strength of this association differs somewhat across samples, with more
pronounced effects for German participants than for the two East Asian groups, perhaps
due to differences in how much emphasis is placed on competition and excellence. Its
direction, however, is the same in all three groups. This evidence is even more com-
pelling in view of the fact that it was obtained with an implicit task specifically designed
to tap into more automatic, rather than deliberate, processes.
Crucially, however, our findings also indicate that the association between location and
valence is subject to linguistic and cultural conventions that affect how location is
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conceptualized—namely as in front or behind. Contingent on the adopted FoR, one and
the same object in one and the same location may be evaluated as more positive or more
negative. Under translation, the further-away object is regarded as the object in front and
hence evaluated more positively, whereas under reflection, it is regarded as behind and
hence evaluated more negatively.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss possible limitations of the current study
and we address a conceptual question that has remained open.
4.1. Possible limitations of the current study
The extent to which the findings from the current study can be generalized may be
limited by characteristics of the samples investigated and by methodological decisions.
4.1.1. Sample characteristics: Distribution of FoR variants
With regard to samples, the distribution of relative FoR variants may be an issue.
Specifically, the proportion of translational references among the Chinese- (and Japanese-)
speaking participants was lower here (24% in Study 1 and 31% in Study 2 for Chinese)
than in the surveys on which our sampling was based (39%).
This lower proportion may have been disadvantageous for the statistical power in our
analyses as it rendered a substantially smaller number of participants ending up in one
condition compared to the other. However, such variation in proportions across studies
and procedures can be expected as people’s FoR selections also depend on demand char-
acteristics of task and situation (see also Wilke, Bender, & Beller, 2019) and are not
assumed to be entirely stable across samples of one population. One question to be tack-
led in future studies is therefore whether the characteristics of a setting (such as assessing
a spatial constellation on an upright computer screen) or details of the participants’ back-
ground (such as dialect or move to a foreign country) affect their preferences for a speci-
fic FoR. At least for the Chinese-speaking participants in the current study, it is possible
that their preferences were affected by the German-speaking environment in which they
currently live and in which they were tested.
To reduce potential influences of linguistic environment, the experiment was set up in
the participant’s mother tongue (including the instructions), and it was conducted by
experimenters who were native speakers of the participant’s mother tongue (cf. Fuhrman
et al., 2011; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013). Even more importantly, though, the lower propor-
tion of translation in the Chinese sample does not impair the theoretical inferences that
the current study aimed to test: Translation and reflection are still linked to diverging
conceptualizations of relative location (of the further-away vs. nearer object as being “in
front”), with positive evaluations of whatever is construed as being “in front.”
4.1.2. Methodological decisions
As explained earlier, we had to choose an axis for recording participants’ responses
that was different from the axis under scrutiny (i.e., participants used keys along the lat-
eral axis to indicate relative position along the sagittal axis).
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Previous work especially on the spatialization of time has emphasized that using con-
gruent axes may be decisive for data interpretation (overview in Bender & Beller, 2014).
For instance, to investigate whether temporal representations unfold along the sagittal, lat-
eral, or vertical axis, it is crucial to provide participants with a sagittal, lateral, and verti-
cal axis (Fuhrman et al., 2011) or, even better, use an entirely open design (Fuhrman &
Boroditsky, 2010). Yet, while such designs are mandatory for exploring the dimensions
onto which time is mapped, they are less important when the dimension is fixed and the
task boils down to determining its direction (by assigning FRONT and BACK, respectively).
Not only do participants tend to be flexible in the dimensions they recruit (Torralbo, San-
tiago, & Lupia~nez, 2006), but they are also able to reorient relatively quickly when
invited or demanded by a task (e.g., Casasanto & Bottini, 2010). Against this background,
we are convinced that the practice blocks in the current study were sufficient to establish
the required association of the response keys with the assessment of relative positions.
A related concern may be addressed at the fact that the response keys along the lateral
axis may be aligned with writing direction for some, but not all participants. Specifically,
Mandarin and Japanese speakers could be assumed to be more exposed to writing direc-
tions from top to bottom. This traditional writing direction, however, is increasingly giv-
ing way to a “western-style,” left-to-right direction in both Japanese and Chinese (Taylor
& Taylor, 2014), and it can be assumed that especially the younger generation from
which our student samples were drawn would be highly familiar with such a left-to-right
writing direction. More importantly, while writing direction seems to inform to a signifi-
cant extent the direction in which time is conceptualized to flow (Bergen & Chan Lau,
2012; Tversky, Kugelmass, & Winter, 1991), it is not obvious whether and how writing
direction would impact on evaluation.
Matters are more serious when it comes to handedness. As mentioned in the introduction,
people tend to evaluate objects on their dominant side as more positive than objects on their
non-dominant side (Casasanto, 2009, 2011). However, this association of handedness with
evaluation can be adjusted in perspective-taking (Kominsky & Casasanto, 2013) and even
reversed by training (Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011). As the vast majority of our participants
was right-handed (93% in Study 1 and 91% in Study 2), we mapped POSITIVE to the right and
NEGATIVE to the left key to accommodate participants’ natural preferences, thereby forcing
the 8% of left-handers in our study to conceptually re-map positive valence with the non-
dominant side (due to the logic of the IAT, this mapping cannot be counterbalanced). If the
enforced re-mapping in left-handers affected their performance, it would have reduced the
effect size, hence contributing to a more conservative outcome. Possibly confounding
effects of the mismatch in axes can therefore be neglected.
Finally, potentially critical concerns could also be raised regarding the IAT itself. As
this method employs binary classification tasks to assess the link between relative loca-
tion and valence by mapping category labels onto response keys, it might be suspected
that participants could have used the category labels associated with the keys or their cor-
respondence in polarity as a convenient short-cut (De Houwer, 2001; Proctor & Cho,
2006). Yet several arguments speak against such an interpretation. First, the cognitive
processing of stimuli required for the spatial task involved the computation of ternary
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relations between figure and ground from one’s own viewpoint, which renders it unlikely
that the observed effects were brought about by effects of labels or polarity only. Second,
for an effect of polarity correspondence to occur, response options for each of the
involved dimensions would have to be aligned purely on the grounds of representing the
unmarked versus marked endpoints of their respective dimension (Proctor & Cho, 2006).
This, however, presupposes that the label for one endpoint (the unmarked pole) is broader
than the other in that it encompasses the entire dimension, while the other (the marked
pole) only refers to its end of the dimension. For instance, “high” (or “happy”) as the
unmarked pole can refer to any point along the “height” (or “happiness”) dimension,
whereas “low” (or “sad”) refers only to its negative end. The dimension unfolding along
the sagittal axis, however, is not verbalized (to the best of our knowledge, there is no
such word as “frontness”) and hence lacks the marked and unmarked poles that would be
a prerequisite for any structural mapping to occur (see also Santiago & Lakens, 2015, for
evidence against polarity correspondence effects on the lateral axis in the domains of
number and time). Most importantly, however, the topic of our study is the reversal of
the association depending on a preference for reflection versus translation, rather than the
nature of the association itself.
4.2. Open questions
Previous work demonstrated that how we conceptualize the location of an entity has
effects on cognitive representations, inferences, co-speech gesture, memory, and even
more basic cognitive processes (Bender & Beller, 2014; Haun, Rapold, Janzen, & Levin-
son, 2011; Levinson, Kita, Haun, & Rasch, 2002; Majid et al., 2004). For instance, judg-
ments of location are typically faster for an object that is nearer to a participant than for
a further-away object. This pattern switches when the participant takes the opposite per-
spective, causing a remapping of spatial relations that leads to faster responses to the
object that is further away for the participant, but nearer for the other person (Cavallo,
Ansuini, Capozzi, Tversky, & Becchio, 2017). While this study suggests that the concep-
tualization of far and near may shift due to perspective-taking, with consequences for the
speed of processing, our study suggests that—even if far and near remain the same—con-
ceptualizing them as in front or behind in distinct ways affects evaluation. Whether these
differences in conceptualization entail differences also with regard to other cognitive pro-
cesses is an important question for future research.
Throughout this article, we have argued that relative position in space is linked with
valence, and we have interpreted respective findings as a more positive evaluation of the
object depending on whether it is conceptualized as being located “in front of” or “behind”
the ground object. As one of the reviewers for this paper noted, it remains unclear, though,
whether it is really the object itself or its location that is evaluated as more positive or nega-
tive. This question is difficult to answer, as the two aspects cannot be disentangled easily. In
fact, for the purpose of the task at hand, object and location define each other to some
extent. Responses to a task like “Is the green object in front of/behind the blue object” deter-
mine a specific location for a specific object. Moreover, neither the objects nor their relative
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positions differ for participants; what differs is the conceptualization of the same location of
the same object depending on the adopted FoR, that is, on perspective. For this very reason,
we maintain, it is not decisive whether location or object attracts a greater share of the eval-
uation. In either case, evaluation would hinge on the adopted FoR, which establishes an
impact of linguistic conventions on representation and evaluation.
Finally, our findings also have broader theoretical implications. If, as our data suggest,
space–valence associations are indeed not exclusively determined by embodied experiences,
but also—and prominently so—by how spatial relations are represented, then the diversity
in those representations across cultural and linguistic groups opens up for greater variability.
FRONT, BACK, LEFT, and RIGHT are locative concepts implicated in the intrinsic and relative
FoRs, but absent from the gamut of absolute FoRs (Levinson, 2003). Given that some lan-
guages exclusively make use of one of the latter (Majid et al., 2004), would their speakers
still form associations between spatial position and valence, and if so, which ones would
they prioritize? Would they still judge things at their dominant side as more positive than
those on their non-dominant side, and a position at the forefront, however conceptualized,
as more positive than one at the back? We know that absolute locations can have particular
value (e.g., Bennardo, 2002; Nu~nez, Cooperrider, Doan, & Wassmann, 2012; Nu~nez & Cor-
nejo, 2012), so perhaps people with a preference for an absolute FoR form similar associa-
tions, but in structurally distinct ways. It would be interesting to examine whether these
associations would still be strong enough to bear on processing fluency and speed.
4.3. Conclusion
While previous work demonstrated that spatial representations have effects on cogni-
tive processing, here we show that how we conceptualize the location of entities may
even reverse the evaluation of these very entities (and/or their location). As diverging
conceptualizations of location are informed by diverging preferences for spatial FoRs
across speech communities, their association with non-spatial conceptualizations and eval-
uations provides a promising new approach to explore effects of language and culture on
cognition, thereby opening up new avenues for investigation in this contested field. Given
how fundamental spatial representations are for human cognition, making headway in this
regard would be a valuable step.
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Notes
1. A different way of putting this would be to treat the ground object as if it were a
second person. In the reflection variant, also referred to as “canonical encounter,”
“vis-a-vis,” or “mirror image” in other research traditions, this fictive person is fac-
ing the observer, while in the translation variant it is looking in the same direction
as the observer, hence also being labeled “aligned” or “in-tandem” (e.g., Clark,
1973; Grabowski, 1999; Hill, 1978, 1982). But note that this perspective fully
accounts only for translation, not for reflection. Canonical encounter, like reflection,
leads to FRONT assignment to the space between the observer and the ground; it can-
not, however, account for the fact that LEFT and RIGHT remain unchanged.
2. The values represent the percentages of participants who preferred the respective
FoR variant, that is, who adopted this variant in at least four out of a set of six
non-oriented, frontal items. The values for German, English, Chinese, and Tongan
are taken from Beller et al. (2015, table 5, p. 12), those for Norwegian, Farsi, and
Japanese from Beller and Bender (2017, table 3, p. 120); values for German in Bel-
ler and Bender (2017) are comparable (reflection: 88.6%). The values do not neces-
sarily add up to 100% as a few participants preferred a third variant, and the
remaining participants exhibited no clear preference for any of the FoR variants.
3. Responses categorized as incorrect included assigning positive [negative] stimuli in
the valence discrimination task to the negative [positive] key and assigning the
nearer [further-away] target in the spatial discrimination task at odds with the par-
ticipant’s inferred preference for translation or reflection.
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